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H
ow can we explain the large and growing dispari-
ties in economic performance across the regions
of Britain as documented in publications like the
Treasury’s report on the regional dimension of
productivity (HM Treasury, 2001)?
Our research indicates that a key influence on variations in
productivity across Britain’s ‘NUTS3’ sub-regions is how
close they are to ‘economic mass’ – the size of population
of working age within driving time of 80 minutes or shorter.
Indeed, according to our calculations, doubling the
economic mass to which an area has access – for example,
by reducing journey times to the nearest big cities – can
raise its productivity by 3.5%.
Explaining Britain’s regional inequalities
The latest data (ONS, 2003) indicate that GDP per head in
London is 54% above the national average and even higher
in inner London. In contrast, GDP per head in the North
East, the poorest of the 11 broad (NUTS1) regions of
Britain, is just 73% of the national average, falling to as low
as 60% of the average in some of its NUTS3 sub-regions.
Moreover, these disparities have increased since 1995 with
GDP per head in London and the South East growing
relative to that in regions on the periphery – Scotland, the
North East, the North West, Wales and the South West.
Regional inequalities in income per head arise from many
different sources – differences in labour force participation,
differences in employment rates, differences in the compo-
sition of skills and occupations and differences in produc-
tivity. All of these are correlated with one another but they
may have distinct and separate causes.
In this research, we focus on disparities in income per
worker and do not attempt to explain rates of labour force
participation or employment. We examine regional varia-
tions in earnings and the role of three key variables: occupa-
tional composition; skill levels; and productivity benefits
associated with ‘agglomeration’ or proximity to a large mass
of economic activity.
Our analysis uses data on Britain’s 126 NUTS3 administra-
tive sub-regions. In order to compile a consistent dataset, a
number of these are combined to give a sample of 119
spatial units that we call ‘areas’. The data cover the period
by Patricia Rice and Tony Venables 
Productivity:
understanding
regional differences
What drives variations in economic performance across Britain?
Patricia Rice and Tony Venables find that access to cities has a big
influence on regional productivity.
1998-2001 and the four years of data are averaged in order
to remove some of the year-to-year volatility.
Several alternative measures of income are available at the
NUTS3 level, including earnings and estimates of gross
value added per worker. We focus on earnings, which
means that we fail to account for income from non-employ-
ment sources but avoid problems arising from allocating
profits and other non-wage income across relatively small
spatial units.
Figure 1 shows the regional distribution of earnings. On the
horizontal axis are the 11 NUTS1 regions, with the squares
indicating average hourly earnings for full-time employees in
each of these broad regions. The diamonds represent the
comparable figures for the NUTS3 sub-regions that make
up each NUTS1 region. 
The national average for full-time hourly earnings is £10.83
an hour. At £14.88, average hourly earnings in London
exceed that average by 37% and are approximately 60%
higher than in the North East, the lowest ranking region.
What is readily apparent from Figure 1 is that the degree of
dispersion within regions is comparable with the degree of
dispersion across regions. All regions, apart from the North
East and Yorkshire and Humberside, include at least one
sub-region in the upper quartile of the distribution (at or
above the upper horizontal line) while only London and the
East do not have one in the lower quartile (at or below the
lower horizontal line).
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Figure 1: Regional and sub-regional disparities in average hourly earnings for full-time employees
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Earnings variation: the effects of
occupational composition and productivity
Regional variation in average earnings can be ‘decom-
posed’ into two parts: differences in productivity and
hence in the wage rates paid to workers in a given
occupation; and differences in the occupational 
composition of employment.
The issue of occupational composition can be summarised
as follows: does a region have low average earnings
because it has a high proportion of workers in low skilled
occupations or because the workers in any given occupa-
tion have low productivity and hence low earnings? We
compare actual average earnings in a region with what
average earnings would be if the region had its own
occupational composition but the same occupational wage
rates as the UK as a whole. The evidence shows that
around a third of the regional variation in earnings can be
explained by occupational composition.
To identify the contribution of productivity differences we
construct a measure of average earnings for each area,
which is conditional on the occupational composition being
the same as that for Britain as a whole – what we call a
productivity index. We also construct an index 
of occupational composition by computing average
earnings in each area based on its actual occupational
composition but assuming that wage rates are equal to the
national average.
These indices are calculated for each of the NUTS3 areas,
and Figure 2 illustrates their averages at the broader
NUTS1 level. The height of the bar for each region
indicates the percentage by which earnings are above or
below the national average. The bars show that only
London, the South East and the East have earnings above
the national average – in the case of London, 37% above
the average.
The purple part of each bar in Figure 2 indicates the propor-
tion of the earnings variation that is due to the region’s
occupational composition while the blue part indicates the
proportion due to productivity differences. It is clear that
occupational composition matters a great deal, supporting
a near 15% earnings gap between London and the North
East. Yet most of the regional variation in earnings across
the NUTS3 areas comes from variation in our productivity
index rather than the index of occupational composition. 
Productivity differences: 
skill levels and economic mass
We now turn to the question of how much of the regional
variation in our productivity index can be explained by
economic geography – proximity to economic mass – 
and how much is due to other factors including regional 
skill differences. 
On the impact of economic mass, our hypothesis is that
‘increasing returns’ cause productivity to be high in regions
that have proximity to cities. US evidence offers some empir-
ical support for such effects – see, for example, Ciccone
and Hall (1996), who find that density of activity has a
positive effect on productivity. Three main sorts of mecha-
nisms have been put forward to explain the relationship
between city size and productivity (see Fujita and Thisse,
2002, for a survey):
If people are 30 minutes closer to a city
in terms of driving times, their impact on
productivity increases fourfold
Figure 2: Occupational composition and productivity
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n One is technological ‘externalities’ – firms learn from
being located near other firms involved in related activities,
so that they innovate and implement new technologies
more efficiently.
n A second is that wide, deep labour markets work more
efficiently, by having lower costs of search for both
workers and employers and making it much easier to
match workers with jobs. 
n The third main mechanism is simply that firms benefit
from lower costs of trade and transport if they have good
access to both their customers and their suppliers of inter-
mediate goods and services.
It is worth noting that while the first of these mechanisms
raises the productivity of a worker of a given type in a given
job, the other two do not. Market access effects mean
simply that firms seek to locate where they can save on
trade and transport costs. 
In this research, unlike earlier studies, we assess not only
the effects of population size on productivity, but also the
distance over which these effects extend. In order to
capture the effects of agglomeration, we compute an index
of economic mass based on a weighted sum of the popula-
tion within a given proximity. More specifically, for each of
the NUTS3 areas, we estimate the population of working
age within each of a series of driving time bands – that is,
within 30 minutes, 30-40 minutes, 40-50 minutes, etc.
Economic mass is measured as the weighted sum of the
population in each time band, where the weights decline
with travel time. In other words, population within 30-40
minutes driving time has a larger weight than population
within 40-50 minutes.
We then estimate two key parameters: the first is the extent
to which productivity increases as economic mass increases
– the ‘elasticity of productivity’ – and the second is the rate
at which the contribution of population to economic mass
declines with travel time – the rate of ‘spatial decay’.
Our estimates point to a fairly steep rate of spatial 
decay so that moving a given population 30 minutes 
closer in terms of driving time increases its impact on
productivity fourfold. In other words, an extra person 
within 30-40 minutes driving time has four times the impact
on productivity of an extra person within 60-70 minutes
driving time.
The estimates of the elasticity of productivity with respect to
economic mass centre around 0.05, which implies that
doubling the economic mass that an area has access to
increases its productivity by 3.5%. This estimate is at the
lower end of the range of estimates found by previous
research: Rosenthal and Strange (2004) report a consen-
sus view that ‘doubling city size seems to increase produc-
tivity by an amount that ranges from roughly 3-8%’.
Is this just a London effect?
To what extent are these findings due simply to the coinci-
dence of a large population and high productivity in London
and the South East? We take a number of steps to estab-
lish the robustness of the findings. These include comput-
ing separate estimates for two sub-groups of the sample: a
South East ‘core’ of 60 NUTS3 areas within 180 minutes
driving time of central London; and a ‘periphery’ of 59
NUTS3 areas more than 180 minutes from London.
For both the South East core and the periphery, we find
strong evidence that productivity increases with population
and that the impact of population declines sharply with
proximity as measured by driving times. That said, the
responsiveness of productivity to increases in economic
mass is somewhat greater in the South East core than in 
the periphery.
Productivity differences: 
the impact of education
The second factor driving regional variation in the productiv-
ity index is the educational qualifications of the local
workforce. In theory, an index of productivity can be
constructed at a sufficiently disaggregated level in terms of
occupation that each occupational group is homogenous in
terms of its educational qualifications. If this were the case,
then the impact of education levels on earnings would come
only through the occupational composition index and not at
all through the productivity index.
In practice, it is not possible to obtain reliable data at such a
disaggregated level and jobs within the same occupational
group can vary significantly in terms of the associated level
of educational qualification. To allow for this, we include the
proportion of the economically active population qualified
with a specified level of education as explanatory variables. 
As might be expected, increasing the proportion of the
workforce qualified to at least first degree level while reduc-
ing the proportion with sub-degree (GCSE, A-levels, etc.)
qualifications raises the productivity index. A 10% increase
in the proportion with degree level qualifications or higher
increases productivity by nearly 1%.
Equally, increasing the proportion of the workforce with no
formal educational qualifications relative to the proportion
qualified to sub-degree level reduces productivity. A 10%
increase in the proportion with no formal qualifications
reduces productivity by around 0.7%.
Accounting for regional 
differences in earnings
We have investigated three causes of regional variations in
earnings: occupational composition; productivity differences
due to agglomeration; and productivity differences due to
education. The relative importance of each of these factors
– and the residual that is unexplained by these factors – is
illustrated in Figure 3. As with previous figures, we just illus-
Below average access to cities contributes 
to the poor performance of the North East, 
the South West, Wales and Scotland
trate the averages for each of the NUTS1 regions, although
the measures are calculated for each NUTS3 area.
As in Figure 2, the overall height of the bar shows the
percentage by which average earnings differ from the
national average, and the black part of each bar shows the
contribution of occupational composition to this difference.
In Figure 3, the contribution of productivity differences is
further decomposed into the contribution of differences in
qualification levels; differences in economic mass; and the
unexplained residual.
What can we conclude from this analysis? First, it is clear
that a robust and quantitatively important determinant of
variations in productivity between NUTS3 areas is the
proximity of each area to economic mass – the presence of
a large population of working age within 80 minutes or less
driving time.
Below average access to economic mass contributes to the
poor performance of the North East, South West, Wales and
Scotland, and reinforces the strong performance of the East
Midlands, London and the South East. The effects are quite
large – around 9% of the difference in earnings between
London and Wales as a whole is attributable to differences
in these scale effects. 
At first sight, the magnitude of the productivity effects of
greater proximity to cities may appear modest. But there are
large variations in access to economic mass across the
NUTS3 areas and the effects are much larger for some
NUTS3 areas than between entire NUTS1 regions. Thus,
while London as a whole has a 6% gain from its access to
economic mass and Wales a 3% loss, this ranges from plus
0.5% in Cardiff to minus 9% in Powys.
Moreover, closer examination of the contribution of
economic mass to explaining regional variations in produc-
tivity suggests that it is particularly important in areas in the
lower half of the productivity distribution. More than two-
thirds of the productivity variation between these areas is
due to variation in their access to cities.
The productivity gains from 
cutting journey times
A final indicator of the quantitative importance of the effects
of economic mass comes from considering the following
thought experiment designed to assess the likely productiv-
ity gains from improvements in transport infrastructure.
Suppose that all journey times were cut by 10%. How much
would productivity increase, holding the qualifications and
location of the labour force constant?
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Continued on page 32
Wales’ overall 3% productivity loss from
below average access ranges from plus 0.5%
in Cardiff to minus 9% in Powys
Figure 3: Decomposition of earnings differentials 
(percentage deviation from GB average)
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C
oncerns about the North-South divide in the
UK are back on the political agenda. To many
observers, the existence of such a divide is
self-evident. For a whole range of indicators,
people in the South score better than people
in the North. People in the South are more
likely to be employed. When they are employed, they earn
more. They are healthier. They are probably happier.
Worryingly, these observers argue, the gap between North
and South may well be growing.
Dig a little deeper, however, and things become less clear.
House prices in the South are booming. So people earn
more but their real income (net of housing costs) may
actually be lower. Also, people in the South are more
educated. Shouldn’t we expect more educated people to
earn more and be more likely to have a job?
The problem is that these observers tend to list symptoms
of the North-South divide rather than causes. But deciding
whether a policy response is needed and what form that
policy response should take requires information on causes
not symptoms. Unfortunately, little is known about the
factors that actually drive differences in regional economic
performance in the UK.
A good place to start looking for some of the causes may
be the geography of the UK economy itself – this is the
North-South divide after all. Firms based in northern regions
are located far away from large markets in the south of the
country and on the continent. Since distance still matters,
surely being far from these large markets must explain part
of the reason why firms in the North do less well than firms
in the South?
But once again, things get slippery when trying to assess
whether these kinds of factors matter. The basic problem is
that this is a chicken and egg situation: firms in the South
may do better because they are near to a bigger market, but
the market is big because firms in the South do better. To
assess the real significance of geography in explaining
differing regional performances, something is needed to
break this circular link.
Ideally, we want some ‘shock’ to the UK economy that
might affect North-South geography but that is independent
by Henry Overman and Alan Winters
Joining the European Union had a big impact on the geography of UK
trade and manufacturing. Henry Overman and Alan Winters trace the
continuing effects of that decision on the North-South divide.
North 
and South
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of that geography. A very good candidate for such a ‘natural
experiment’ is the UK’s 1973 accession to the European
Economic Community (EEC) as the European Union (EU)
was then called. EEC accession had a large effect on trade
patterns and would appear to advantage markets in the
South over those in the North.
The impact of EEC accession on the
geography of UK trade
What happened to the geography of the UK economy 
in response to this trade shock? In other words, how did
EEC accession affect the location of economic activity in
the UK? The data that can help us answer this question 
are for the manufacturing sector from the early 1970s to
the early 1990s. But despite this limited sectoral and time
coverage, lessons from studying this period of UK 
history can help us understand what drives UK regional
differences more generally. Not only that, but it may 
also allow better predictions of the potential implications
for the UK economy of the deepening integration implied
by joining the euro.
Figure 1 shows five-year averages of the percentage of
UK trade (the total of imports and exports) accounted for
by the original six founders of the EEC (the EC6). The
figure tells what is, by now, a familiar story: EEC acces-
sion shifted the direction of UK trade away from former
trading partners and towards the countries in the EC6.
In the two decades leading up to EEC accession, the
importance of UK trade with the EC6 was growing, but
fairly slowly. In the 20-odd years before 1973, the percent-
age of UK trade with one of these six countries had grown
from about 13% to 21%. In contrast, in the 20 years after
accession, the percentage of trade with the EC6 more
than doubled from 21% to 44%.
This post-accession reorientation of UK trade by source or
destination is well known; the fact that it was associated
with a geographical reorientation is not so well known.
Figures 2a and 2b show this geographical reorientation
for imports and exports, respectively. To understand the
figure, note that the underlying data give the share of UK
imports and exports that enter or leave through particular
UK ports (including airports). The figure then plots these
shares for nine regional groups:
n Thames and Kent (THAKE);
n Haven and East Anglia (HAVEA);
n Sussex and Hampshire (SUHAM);
n South, South West and Cornwall (SSWCO);
n North East-Humber (NEHUM);
n East Scotland (ESCOT);
n Rest of sea ports (RESTP);
n London airports (AIRLO);
n and other airports (AIROT).
The figures illustrate two key characteristics of the changing
geography of UK trade:
n First, the growing share for the top two segments (AIROT
and AIRLO), which clearly captures the growing importance
of air transportation in the value of UK trade.
n Second, the gradual reorientation of trade towards the
South East port groups – roughly speaking, the lower the
segment, the closer the port groups are to the South East
corner of the UK. Between 1970 and 1992, the ports in the
south of the country – THAKE, HAVEA, SUHAM and
SSWCO – saw their share of manufactured imports increase
by 20 percentage points – from 42% in 1970 to 62% in 1992.
The reorientation of manufactured exports is in a similar direc-
tion but not as marked: the ports in the South saw their share
of manufactured exports rise from 47% to 58%.
In summary, the general picture for both exports and
imports is of a reorientation to ports in the southern part of
the country. 
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Joining the EEC shifted UK trade away from former
trading partners and towards the six original members
Figure 1: Percentage of UK trade with the EC6
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Five-year periods
Which UK ports have benefited most?
The reorientation is associated with very significant changes
for particular ports. Table 1 shows the top five UK ports in
terms of manufactured exports for both the early 1970s and
the early 1990s. The table highlights some important
changes over the period. Most notably, there has been the
rise of Dover as a major trading port and the corresponding
decline of Liverpool. The former saw its share of both imports
and exports increase more than threefold over the 20-year
period, while Liverpool saw a decline of similar magnitude.
The southward reorientation shows up in the fact that all five
of the UK’s major ports in the early 1990s are based in the
south of the country compared to only three in the early
1970s. Yet the contrast between the relative performance of
London and Felixstowe urges caution in attributing the
changes in port performance to port location alone.
Felixstowe and London are both located in the South and
both function as major specialist deep-sea ports. But while
Felixstowe saw its share of UK trade increase, London saw
a marked decline.
Such contrasts suggest the importance of factors other
than location in determining port outcomes. Among those
explaining the different experiences of Felixstowe and
London is that the former was outside the National Dock
CentrePiece Autumn 200410
Since 1973, there has been a reorientation of
UK manufacturing trade to ports in the South
Table 1: Top five ports for exports 
(percentage share of manufactured exports)
1970-2 1990-2
Port % Port %
Heathrow Airport 18.9 Dover 19.4
London 16.9 Heathrow Airport 14.6
Harwich 7.9 Felixstowe 12.4
Liverpool 6.9 Southampton 5.7
Dover 5.6 London 5.1
Figure 2a: Manufactured imports by port region
Figure 2b: Manufactured exports by port region
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Labour Scheme. This was a highly restrictive labour agree-
ment, which, until its abolition, reduced productivity and
stifled innovation in member ports. The figures suggest that
restrictive practices and a failure to innovate can spell
problems for ports wherever they are located.
The evidence presented so far has been based on the
shares of particular ports or groups of ports. Figure 3a
attempts to capture the geographical pattern of trade more
directly. It summarises the distance from Dover of an
average £1 of exports over time.  This figure eloquently
captures the gravitation of UK manufacturing trade towards
the ports of the South East. The average distance 
from Dover of an average £1 of exports fell by around 
35% over the 20-year period. Figures for imports show a
similar decline although the magnitude is slightly smaller
than for exports.
So EEC accession resulted in a reorientation of the UK’s
trade towards the south of the country. What about the
impact on manufacturing activity itself? Figure 3b is the
counterpart to Figure 3a, but plotted to show the distance
from Dover of the centre of gravity of UK manufacturing.
Clearly, the southward movement for total manufacturing is
much less pronounced than for exports.
Does this mean that EEC accession had no impact on the
location of UK manufacturing industry and that market
access plays no role in understanding regional economic
performance? It turns out that the answer is no, but 
isolating the impact requires looking at individual manufac-
turing sectors and using economic theory to help structure
the investigation.
Lessons from the new 
economic geography
What does economic theory predict about the likely
impact of EEC accession on the location of particular
manufacturing sectors? Obviously, traditional theories of
comparative advantage, which emphasise the fact that differ-
CentrePiece Autumn 2004 11
Dover has become a major trading port and
Liverpool has seen a corresponding decline
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ent EU countries have different endowments of labour and
capital, help us understand the changing composition of
manufacturing across sectors. This must play a part in under-
standing the overall decline in UK manufacturing during this
period as production shifted to EU partners. It could also
clearly help in understanding the shifts in the location of
aggregate economic activity if particular regions specialise in
sectors that do relatively better as the UK adjusts to its new
trading conditions.
But the main focus here is on how trade shocks affected the
location of particular sectors, a question on which tradi-
tional theories of comparative advantage are essentially
silent. Studying this requires theoretical foundations that
focus directly on the impact of opening up to trade on
economic geography. These effects have been the focus 
of the recent boom in research on the ‘new economic
geography’, predominantly associated with urban and inter-
national economists, many of whom are working in CEP’s 
globalisation programme.
This research programme starts from the principle that the
location of economic activity depends on a balance between
forces of ‘agglomeration’ and ‘dispersion’ – in other words, a
balance between forces that attract firms to large markets
and those forces that repel them from those markets.
Firms that locate in big markets benefit from being close to
both their customers and their suppliers. Offsetting these
advantages is the fact that they operate in a more crowded
market, which increases competition in product and factor
markets and puts downward pressure on prices and upward
pressure on wages.
The balance of these forces depends on the level of trade
integration between different locations. When trade between
regions or countries is difficult, the cost of serving distant
customers is so large that it dominates the desire to be near
customers in the large market and economic activity is
dispersed. As trade becomes easier, the opposite is true and
agglomeration can occur. If locations become very integrated
and the cost of trade becomes very low, then congestion
costs can emerge and industry can once again disperse.
The impact of EEC accession on the geography
of UK manufacturing
What does such analysis imply for the economic geography
of the UK as it opened up to trade with Europe? One possi-
bility is that border regions, in this case the South, benefited
disproportionately from the improved market access that
came with EEC accession – that is, firms located in regions
closest to the continent benefited most. But this is not the
only possibility when a country opens up to trade: allowing
for increased product market competition felt via imports, it
is possible that border regions may suffer if firms relocate to
regions in other parts of the country
Thinking about the specific case of the UK, this means
that in some manufacturing sectors, increased import
competition in the South may have outweighed 
Improved export market access has pulled employment in 
some manufacturing sectors towards the South
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better market access and the South might have lost out
relative to the North. In other words, theory no longer
predicts that EEC accession should necessarily have led
to better economic performance of southern regions 
in all manufacturing sectors. Instead, we need to look at
different manufacturing sectors in different regions and
think about the balance between product market compe-
tition (which should be associated with lower 
employment) and increased market access (which
implies the opposite).
To assess the strength of these two forces, our research
has so far focused on how EEC accession explains
changes in regional employment in particular sectors.
Overall, the results seem to support the hypothesis that
the reorientation of trade associated with EEC accession
did have some significant effects on the economic
geography of UK manufacturing. More than 40 manufac-
turing sectors out of 80 show a positive impact on
employment of better export market access with most
other sectors showing no effect. In these sectors, every-
thing else equal, manufacturing employment shifted
towards the South in response to better market access in
those regions.
The results for import competition suggest that this too
has a role in explaining changes in the location of UK
manufacturing. 17 sectors out of 80 show negative
employment effects associated with increased import
competition. In these sectors, everything else equal,
manufacturing employment shifted towards the North.
Working out the overall impact of EEC accession means
balancing out these two effects for different sectors.
Doing that, we see, for example, that the centre of gravity
of the pharmaceutical industry moved southwards while
that of textile production moved northwards.
Clearly, these results are not the end of the story, but they
are a start. For now, the evidence presented here
suggests that cumulative causation and better access to
EU markets may explain some of the difference between
northern and southern regions. Of course, much more
work needs to be done to understand how important
these effects are relative to other theories in explaining
the differing economic performance of the UK’s regions.
But it is only through careful examination of the underly-
ing causes that we will truly be able to analyse the need
for – and possible role of – regional policy.
This article summarises ‘Trade Shocks and Industrial Location: 
The Impact of EEC Accession on the UK’, CEP Discussion 
Paper No. 588 and ‘The Geography of UK International Trade’,
CEP Discussion Paper No. 606, both by Henry G Overman and 
L Alan Winters.
Henry G Overman is a lecturer in economic geography at the
London School of Economics and an active member of CEP’s
research programme on globalisation. L Alan Winters is Director
of the Development Research Group at the World Bank and an
associate in CEP’s globalisation programme.
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(eds), Handbook of Urban and Regional Economics, volume 4,
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Midelfart, KH and HG Overman (2002), ‘Delocation and European
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35, 321-59. 
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‘The Economic Geography of Trade, Production and Income: 
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Greater import competition has pushed employment in some
manufacturing sectors away from the South
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by Arnaud Chevalier and Peter Dolton
Teacher 
shortage: 
another impending crisis?
How can the UK education system recruit and retain the high-quality
teachers it needs, especially for the places and subjects where there
are severe shortages? Arnaud Chevalier and Peter Dolton examine
the role of pay and other incentives in getting people into the
profession and keeping them.
O
ver the past 50 years, the UK has lurched
from one crisis to another in the recruit-
ment and retention of teachers, particu-
larly for secondary schools. Now the
shortage of teachers looks set to become
even more of a problem as large numbers
of people currently in the profession near
retirement. Shortages are especially acute in subjects like
maths, science and modern languages and in specific
geographical areas like inner London, where there are
many alternative careers. A growing body of economic
research on the labour market for teachers (much of it
carried out at CEP) is seeking to understand these short-
ages and provide insights into potential policy measures.
To some extent, the labour market for teachers functions
like any other labour market, with schools acting as
employers. But there are two notable characteristics shared
with some other public service occupations like health care
professionals. These are that the state has both monopoly
power in the provision of credentials – the state determines
who is qualified to teach – and near ‘monopsony’ (monop-
oly buyer) power in the recruitment of teachers – since most
teachers are employed in state schools. What’s more,
teaching is highly unionised and the government generally
determines pay.
The demand for teachers
The first key element in the demand for teachers is the
demographic pattern of pupil numbers. The total number of
primary and secondary pupils in state schools since 1946
has fluctuated considerably, from a low of three and a half
million pupils in 1947 and 1985 to a high of nearly five
million in the mid-1970s.
The second demographic trend affecting the demand for
teachers is the age distribution of the stock of existing
teachers. Figure 1 shows the age distributions of primary
and secondary teachers in England in 2000. Currently, the
official retirement age is 65 but teachers can retire as early
as 55. There is a substantial fall in the number of teachers
at the early retirement age of 55 and only a minimal number
of teachers remain in the profession after the age of 60.
England has an ageing teaching profession, especially in
primary schools. 40% of all teachers are aged 45-55, and
those aged over 55 account for another 6% of the
workforce. Within the next ten years, nearly 50% of the
current workforce is likely to have retired. Since the number
of pupils is not forecast to decrease significantly, at the
current level of recruitment, there is likely to be a large
shortage of teachers.
To some extent, the government can influence the retire-
ment plans of existing teachers. For example, a change in
the pension scheme in 1997 made it less financially advan-
tageous for teachers to claim early retirement and led to a
fourfold reduction in the proportion of teachers retiring
before 60. 
Several other features complicate the demand for teachers:
n First, the financial administration of education at local level
is performed by local education authorities (LEAs). 
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Teachers’ relative pay is a perennial issue: when it’s low,
graduates are less likely to enter the profession
Figure 1: The age distribution of teachers in England in 2000
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This means that although
central government sets overall
spending limits and determines
teachers’ pay, it does not 
have day-to-day control over
how many teachers an 
LEA employs.
n Second, since the 1988
Education Reform Act, schools
have become financially
autonomous with devolved
budgets. Hence it is at the 
level of the individual school
where decisions about teacher
recruitment are taken, using 
calculations of predicted income based on expected 
student numbers.
n Finally, desired pupil-teacher ratios are influenced by
educational criteria and pay negotiated with trade unions.
So it is not surprising that the setting of pay scales and
attempts to meet target pupil-teacher ratios could be incom-
patible with the constraints of government spending limits.
In these circumstances, a school’s capital budget for build-
ings and equipment may have to be cut to ‘balance the
books’. This also gives rise to relatively large variation in
pupil-teacher ratios and per pupil funding across different
regions of the country and
compounds the difficulties of
assessing the aggregate
demand for teachers.
Calculating the exact size of the
shortage of teachers is difficult.
For example, government
estimates are sometimes based
on the number of existing vacan-
cies. These are often inconsis-
tent with figures for the shortfall
of demand over supply based
on using desired pupil-teacher
ratios and pupil numbers.
Figure 2 shows the demand for teachers calculated by
taking desired pupil-teacher ratios as published by the
government and multiplying them by actual pupil numbers.
Teacher supply is taken from government data on the
number of teachers in service, and the ‘excess demand’ – or
teacher shortage – is the gap between demand and supply.
This calculation suggests that in 2000, there was a national
aggregate shortage of 34,000 teachers.
Figure 2 shows that there has been excess demand for
teachers almost continuously throughout the post-war
period. The main problem has been a shortage of second-
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Nearly 50% of primary teachers may have
retired within the next ten years
Figure 2: Excess demand for teachers 1946-2001
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ary teachers, although the difference in excess demand
between primary and secondary teachers disappeared
towards the end of the 1990s. The 1970s were the only
time in the post-war period when there was a (small) excess
supply of teachers.
In some cases, the demand for teachers appears to change
sharply from one year to the next. This is not due to
demographic change but to modification of the official
desired pupil-teacher ratio. Since a shortage of teachers
seems to be a permanent feature, the remaining discussion
focuses on what determines the supply of teachers.
The supply of teachers: quantity
All teachers in the UK must be qualified. In England, a quali-
fication can be obtained after a four-year university degree
in education or a one-year post-graduate certificate of
education (PGCE). Newly qualified teachers must register
with the General Teaching Council and gain ‘qualified
teacher status’ to work in the state sector. Ultimately, the
government has some control over the stock of teachers
since it can determine how many places there are on
teacher training courses.
Many factors influence the choice of whether or not to
become a teacher. Teacher training courses are not always
filled and attendance varies by subject. In the mid-1990s,
there were 20% fewer students training to be secondary
teachers than the government had targeted, although this
shortage has decreased to approximately 6% more
recently. By subject, the shortage is biggest in maths,
modern languages and geography with shortfalls ranging
between 20% and 30% in 2000/1, for example. 
Measures to increase the retention of trainees and new
teachers have been at the forefront of the political 
agenda on education. The most prominent measures 
are repayment of student loans for up to ten years and 
a hardship allowance for
students in shortage subjects
committing to become teachers,
bursaries for completing the
PGCE and ‘golden hellos’ of
£4,000 for new teachers in
shortage subjects.
The flow of newly qualified
teachers does not necessarily
indicate the level of overall
supply. Focusing on those
currently working as a teacher
ignores individuals who are
available to teach but not
currently employed as teachers.
Supply can be calculated as
consisting of those entering the
profession and those remaining
in teaching from the previous
year. For example, Dolton, Tremayne and Chung (2003)
report that in 2000, 18,000 new entrants and 6,000 re-
entrants joined the teacher workforce.
But the difficulty is not just recruiting teachers but keeping
them in the classroom. Some trainees drop out and others
decide not to become teachers. Smithers and Robinson
(2003) find that of 100 registered trainees, 88 passed the
final examination, but only 59 were teaching a year later.
After three years, only 53 of the original trainees were still
in the classroom.
This wastage not only adds to the costs of providing
teacher training but also has negative effects on children’s
performance. Dolton and Newson (2003) find that inexperi-
enced teachers are less effective in helping pupils achieve
good educational outcomes.
The supply of teachers: quality
One of the most important debates in education is whether
the quality of teachers is high enough. While teacher quality
is notoriously difficult to measure, research suggests that
some teachers do consistently perform better than others
over time and that teacher effectiveness is an important
determinant of pupil attainment. 
But even if it is unclear whether teachers with better
academic records or qualifications are necessarily better
teachers, we need to be concerned about recruiting teach-
ers from the lower end of the ability distribution. There is
some evidence from work carried out at CEP (Chevalier et
al, 2002; and Nickell and Quintini, 2002) that today’s teach-
ers are being drawn from a lower part of the educational
achievement or ability distribution than they were in the past.
The issue of how to recruit better teachers and provide
them with appropriate incentives is thus an important one. It
is this we turn to next, beginning with a discussion of what
has happened to teachers’
relative pay over time.
Teachers’ pay
The main element of the UK’s
strategy to increase teacher
recruitment and retention has
been to offer financial incentives.
Since teaching competes with
all other professional occupa-
tions open to graduates, policy-
makers clearly need to take
account of changes in the gradu-
ate labour market when deter-
mining teachers’ pay. It is not
pay in teaching alone that
matters but teachers’ pay
relative to potential ‘forgone’
earnings associated with an
alternative career. 
Today’s teachers may be drawn from a lower part
of the ability distribution than in the past
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Figure 3 shows the decline in teachers’ relative pay compared
with average non-manual earnings between 1955 and 2000.
Since 1992, teachers’ pay has fallen by 6% relative to
average non-manual earnings (although the decline ‘bottomed
out’ in the late 1990s). Over the longer run, teachers’ pay
follows a repetitive cyclical pattern: a period of sustained
decline followed by a dramatic increase, usually as a result of
a major government report on the crisis in teacher supply. 
Figure 3 shows the process of ‘catch-up’ following a decline
in relative pay, the most notable example being the average
pay rise of 29% following the
Houghton report in 1974. This
was followed by four or five years
of decline in real pay before the
Clegg Commission award of
1980 restored 1974 ‘relativities’.
Compared with the earnings 
of other public service profes-
sions, teachers’ pay has also
declined: by 11% relative to
police earnings since 1981 
and by 25% relative to nurses
since 1973. 
Who becomes a
teacher?
It is clear that relative pay 
in teaching has a marked 
effect on graduates’ choice of
occupation. In particular, the
lower teachers’ relative pay (or the growth of their pay), the
less likely it is a graduate will choose teaching as a career.
Relative pay affects both initial career choices and choices
made later in an individual’s career. Dolton (1990) finds
considerable inertia in the profession and suggests that this
may be partially due to different individuals’ subjective 
evaluation of the relative pecuniary and non-pecuniary
rewards to teaching.
Chevalier et al (2002) explain the market position for teach-
ers between 1966 and the mid-1990s using data from five
separate cohorts of graduates.
This makes it possible to
simulate the effects of possible
teachers’ pay rises over time.
They find that relative pay in
teaching compared with alterna-
tive professions has a significant
impact on the likelihood of
graduates choosing to teach,
although the impact depends on
the market situation at the time.
The effect of pay on teacher
supply is strongest when it is
relatively low or following a
period of decline. It is also
strongest for individuals who
have graduated more recently.
For example, increasing teach-
ers’ pay by 10% would have led
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to an increase of nearly 10% in
teacher supply in the mid-1980s
but only 2% in the mid-1960s or
early 1990s. 
Labour market conditions at the
time that occupational choices
are made are also important.
Dolton, Tremayne and Chung
look at time series data over the
whole post-war period and find
that aggregate labour market
conditions, particularly levels of
unemployment, are important
determinants of teacher supply.
In particular, the supply of gradu-
ates to teaching is counter-
cyclical with most graduates’ perception of teaching (and
willingness to enter the profession), improving when gradu-
ate prospects are poor in alternative occupations and when
graduate unemployment is high. 
Relative pay affects both the decision to become a teacher
and the decision to remain a teacher. Dolton and Van der
Klaauw (1995) find that the higher is teachers’ relative pay,
the less likely they are to leave teaching. They examine the
importance of relative pay in teacher turnover decisions by
simulating a uniform 10% increase in relative monthly
earnings. This leads to a 9% reduction in the probability of
teachers leaving within five years of being in the profession,
or a total retention rate of 69%. A 25% increase in pay
raises the percentage of teachers still in teaching after five
years to 73%.
Work using US data suggests that raising teachers’ pay
could improve teacher quality (Ballou and Podgursky, 1997).
But attracting more able students to teaching is not the only
difficulty for policy-makers. Since individuals with higher
ability generally command higher pay, high ability teachers
are at more risk of leaving the profession than less talented
teachers. To negate the lure of improved outside opportuni-
ties on ‘able’ teacher retention, fast track programmes have
been introduced in the UK with the aim of recruiting and
retaining the most able graduates by shortening pay scales
while providing them with additional training, support and
supervision and/or performance-related pay schemes.
The supply of women teachers
Another key aspect of teacher supply is the relative 
popularity of the profession with women graduates. 
A crucial aspect of the distinction between the occupa-
tional choices of men and women is that the latter are
often making simultaneous decisions about starting a
family and whether to participate in the labour market. This
is particularly true in teaching, where a common view is
that the profession has ‘complementarities’ with family
formation, notably the ease of returning to teaching after a
career interruption.
Dolton and Makepeace (1993)
find that the choice of teaching
as a career is intimately related
to women’s decision to partici-
pate in the labour market. This
is true in the sense that
unobserved factors, which
make a woman more likely to
select a career outside teach-
ing, make them less likely to
participate in the labour market
and vice versa. This generates
a positive correlation between
the decision to work and the
choice of teaching as a career. 
Feminisation of the teaching
profession does add some difficulties to planning teacher
supply as many women will at some point interrupt their
career for family reasons. Smithers and Robinson find that
12% of primary teachers who resign do so for maternity
or family reasons. Women are also more likely to leave
teaching than men so policies to facilitate work and child-
rearing, such as subsidised child-care or reduced
workload, may increase teacher supply. Analysis of non-
pecuniary factors in occupational choice by Dolton,
Makepeace and Van der Klaauw (1989) finds that such
factors are generally very important in the choice of teach-
ing, and they are more important for women graduates. 
Performance-related pay
While the evidence is that raising pay has a positive effect
on teacher supply, it remains very difficult to design a pay
package that would guarantee a supply of high quality
teachers. Numerous authors criticise across-the-board pay
increases for existing teachers as inefficient since they are
unlikely to improve performance radically. Instead, over the
years, there have been various attempts at introducing
differential pay for teachers. Since 2000, this mainly
focuses on performance-related pay (PRP), which is
intended to boost teachers’ pay while making increases
dependent on teachers demonstrating effective perform-
ance in their jobs.
The system of performance management in the UK has two
main elements. First, each teacher is appraised annually by
his or her senior line manager on the basis of previously
agreed objectives. At the second performance review
stage, the assessment is used by the head teacher as a
basis for decisions on pay in the coming year.
PRP currently applies only to the most experienced teach-
ers, those who have reached the ‘threshold’ at the top of
the pay scale for classroom teachers (usually six or seven
years into their careers). The idea is that individuals who
can prove themselves effective teachers, assessed against
a set of nationally agreed criteria, will ‘cross the threshold’,
receiving an immediate £2,000 pay rise and access to a
Graduates are considerably less likely to be
teachers if they live in London
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new higher pay scale for class-
room teachers. Around 80% of
teachers who were eligible for
the threshold payment when
PRP was introduced in 2000
applied and around 97%
actually received it.
It is unclear whether PRP is the
appropriate vehicle to solve
problems in recruitment and
retention of teachers. For
example, PRP may not be 
the best vehicle to improve
teacher performance, since the
outcome of interest – pupil
achievements – is multi-dimen-
sional and depends on the efforts of a group of teachers
rather than individuals. 
Of course, it is by and large an empirical question as to
whether PRP actually improves teacher performance.
Evaluation for the UK is not possible since the scheme
was introduced nationally but evidence from elsewhere in
the world tends not to support PRP schemes. In fact,
over time, most schemes for teachers have collapsed and
there is evidence that the ability of PRP to motivate staff
is limited.
Teacher shortages in specific subjects 
and geographical areas
The fact that teachers’ pay and conditions are determined
for the whole market presents problems with teacher
supply in particular subjects and geographical areas. 
For example, training places for teachers of subjects like
physical education are always over-subscribed. But there
are always unfilled places for teachers specialising in
maths and modern languages despite the wealth of finan-
cial incentives to induce people to enrol. And because
outside options for teachers with high ability in maths or
languages tend to be higher, they are also more likely to
leave the profession.
Smithers and Robinson find that teachers in maths, 
information technology, languages and English are 
disproportionately more likely to resign. What’s more,
among all graduates, there is evidence that the average
return to a maths degree is higher than for many other
subjects (Walker and Zhu, 2001). This means that the
opportunity cost of teaching may be a lot higher for a
maths graduate than a history graduate in terms of the
forgone earnings in alternative jobs. 
As with other public service professions, there have also
been shortages of teachers in certain areas of the
country, most markedly in inner London and the South
East. Official vacancy rates are two to three times higher
than the national average in London despite it being the
area that relies most on
temporarily filled positions.
Chevalier et al (2002) estimate
that an average graduate is 15
percentage points less likely to
be a teacher if he or she lives in
London. Smithers and
Robinson find that teachers in
London are also more likely to
leave or transfer to other
schools than teachers in other
geographical areas. Official
turnover and wastage rates in
2002 were respectively 20%
and 11% in London compared
with 15% and 9% for England.
Recruiting difficulties in London are thought to stem from
the better alternative careers for potential teachers and the
upward pressure on living costs associated with a more
competitive labour market. But it is possible that recruiting
difficulties in London have more to do with the job condi-
tions in inner city schools than outside job opportunities and
living costs.
Nevertheless, from April 2003, a specific pay scale 
has been defined for the capital to replace the previous
London allowance: on the lower pay scale, teachers in
London are paid £3,500 more than in the rest of the
country; and the pay differential for teachers on the 
PRP scale is up to £6,000. And budgets permitting,
schools have greater flexibility with teachers’ pay. A range
of recruitment and retention allowances – £1,000-5,400 –
can be offered to assist towards relocation, travel to work
or provision of care for dependents. Schools will be able to
offer this allowance to a new or established maths teacher
but not to other teachers in the same school. 
Non-financial incentives for teachers
Most government policies to retain teachers concentrate on
financial incentives. But surveys of teachers reveal that pay
is not the only determinant of their dissatisfaction. Chevalier
et al (2003) find that teachers are less satisfied in their jobs
than many comparable graduates working in other fields
and are particularly dissatisfied with hours of work.
Compared with other graduates, teachers are 12 percent-
age points more likely to claim to be dissatisfied with their
hours. Compared with other employees, teachers’ hours
are concentrated during term time with an average working
week of 52 hours.
It has long been asserted that many people become teach-
ers because of the non-pecuniary benefits, long summer
holidays being the classic example. But more recently, with
the advent of the ‘quasi-market’ and increased accountabil-
ity, these non-pecuniary benefits may have become less
attractive. For example, the national curriculum and the
Pay is not the only cause of teachers’
dissatisfaction with their work
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rigours of inspection procedures may have given teachers
an excessive administrative burden.
Interviews with teachers leaving the profession confirm that
heavy workloads and other characteristics of schools rank
higher than pay as a reason for quitting. For over 40% of
the leavers surveyed by Smithers and Robinson, nothing
could have made them stay. For the others, changes in
workload or pupil behaviour were more likely to be cited
than pay as an inducing factor to stay. To get a high quality
teaching profession in place, all of these difficult issues
need to be addressed.
This article summarises ‘The Labour Market for Teachers’ by 
Arnaud Chevalier and Peter Dolton, chapter 3 of WhatÕs 
the Good of Education? The Economics of Education in the 
UK edited by Stephen Machin and Anna Vignoles 
(Princeton University Press, forthcoming, 2005). 
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Performance-related pay is unlikely to solve
the problem of teacher recruitment
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D
uring the 1990s, the US labour market
drew plaudits around the world for the
large number of jobs it created. The rate of
unemployment fell to levels below those of
most other advanced economies and the
percentage of the population in employ-
ment rose to its highest level in history, as
even the less skilled and former ‘welfare mothers’ found
jobs. At the same time, productivity grew smartly, real
wages rose after decades of stagnation or decline, the
seemingly inexorable rise of inequality ended and poverty
fell. Europe marvelled at the ‘great American jobs machine’
and sought solutions to European problems in US policies
and practices. 
What a difference a few years make. In the 2004 election,
the question in the United States was not how the great
American jobs machine functions but why the economy
has produced a ‘jobless recovery’. Three years after the
Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER) declared that the country
was in economic recovery and nearly four years after the
Bush administration claimed that the trough had been
reached, fewer people were working than at the outset of
the recovery. Although by historical standards, the percent-
age of the population in employment remains quite high, it
is now two percentage points lower than three years ago. 
Economic and political fallout 
from the jobless recovery
The jobless recovery since 2001 has created greater
economic problems for Americans than the sluggish job
performance of Europe in the 1990s created for
Europeans. The United States has only a limited safety net
for workers. Those who lose their jobs risk losing health
care or seeing their family drop from the middle class into
poverty. American welfare policy means having full employ-
ment not a social welfare state.
The jobless recovery has also created political problems
for the Bush administration since it suggests to many that
‘trickle-down’ economic policies are more trick than treat
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by Richard Freeman and William Rodgers
whatever happened to the great
American jobs machine?
In terms of employment creation, the US economic expansion since
2001 has been the worst in over half a century. Richard Freeman 
and William Rodgers explore what’s been going on in the labour
market during this ‘jobless recovery’.
Joblessrecovery:
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for Americans on middle incomes and below. The weakest
area of support for the administration in opinion polls was
in economic issues. For example, in the spring 2004 Work
Trends survey by the Heldrich Center for Workforce
Development, only 7% of workers said that the President
was doing an excellent job in handling issues related to
jobs. This compared with 32% who said he was doing a
poor job. Among employers, only 18% said he was doing
an excellent job while just over a fifth rated his job as poor.
Since GDP and productivity have grown smartly since
2001, the underlying reason for this low rating must have
been the jobless recovery. In the long run, the massive
balance of trade deficit and fiscal deficit may exact a
greater toll on the US economy, but jobs are what seem to
matter most to voters. Of the 1,100 likely voters surveyed
by the Los Angeles Times in September 2004, 46% said
Kerry would do a better job at creating jobs; 39% picked
Bush. And the CNN/USA Today/Gallop poll of 
9/10 October found that 28% of likely voters put the 
economy on par with terrorism as the most important issue.
Gallop reported that since July, the economy has been 
the first or second most frequently chosen issue among
likely voters.
These concerns cut across the income scale. As an example
of how the jobs issue affects an upper income suburban
community, more parents have requested scholarship
support for the extended day care programme in 
Brookline, Massachusetts in recent months than in the 
past decade or so. This programme enables an unemployed
parent to look for work and accept a job immediately if they
get an offer. 
US employment patterns across 
different groups, states and sectors
Our research is examining the operation of the US labour
market in the jobless recovery. Because the country is in the
middle of this phenomenon, ours is a real-time analysis,
some of whose conclusions could change if the recovery
stalled or employment grew suddenly. But even rapid
change in the labour market will not gainsay the surprising
US failure to generate jobs for so long in this recovery.
Our first finding is that the current recovery has been the
worst in recent US economic history for employment
creation (see Figure 1). The failure of the great American
jobs machine is not a matter of election year hype.
Employment growth looks bad in comparison to all previous
post-World War II recoveries, including the 1990s recovery,
when employment also took what appeared to be an
extraordinarily long period to recover. Typically, employment
growth lags business cycle recoveries by three to four
months. In the 1990s recovery, the lag was a little over two
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For jobs, the current recovery has been
the worst since World War II
Figure 1: Cumulative employment growth during the seven most recent recoveries
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Source: Nonfarm payroll
establishment data. US
Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics
(www.bls.gov). Each series
is benchmarked to the start
of its recovery as defined by
the NBER Business Cycle
Dating Committee.
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years. In the current recovery, the lag is three to four years
and, at the time of writing, the labour market has shown only
twitches of recovery. 
We have examined the growth of employment sector by
sector, anticipating that we would find some sectors 
with employment growth that looks normal for a recovery
and others with abnormal employment experience. This
would have provided valuable clues to the cause of the
jobless recovery.
We have been surprised to find that in many private sector
industries, employment as of late 2004 is markedly below
employment at the start of the recovery. For example, in
August 2004, employment was 9.1% lower in durable
manufacturing and 8.5% lower in non-durable manufactur-
ing than when the recovery began. Employment was also
down in retail, wholesale and transportation. It had grown
modestly in education and hospitals, government, finance
and insurance, and some other services. But it had fallen in
many other service sectors, including the broad ‘informa-
tion’ industries (telecoms, newspapers, movies, cable TV,
etc.), a major part of the new economy that is supposed to
be producing good jobs to replace declining employment in
traditional manufacturing. Figure 2 compares these growth
numbers with previous recoveries.
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White-collar workers have had more trouble finding
jobs than in virtually any other recovery
Figure 2 Employment growth at similar points in the recovery
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We have examined employment growth among groups
especially sensitive to the swings of the business cycle:
African-Americans, new labour market entrants and the less
skilled. Historically, recessions take their first toll on these
groups but in recoveries, they benefit from larger increases
in employment than more advantaged groups. The evidence
is that African-Americans and new labour market entrants
have had worse employment experiences relative to other
workers than in the previous two recessions and recoveries.
We have also examined the labour market for the highly
skilled. One of the most stunning facts about the post-2001
labour market is that the rate of unemployment among
electrical engineers has exceeded the national unemploy-
ment rate. White-collar workers have had more trouble
finding jobs than in virtually any other recovery.
Analysing employment growth by state, we find that
compared with the current recovery, the typical state’s
employment grew 2.6-4.8% faster in the 1990s recovery
and 4.5-6.3% faster in the 1980s recovery. Current
employment growth is substantially weaker across the
board, with two distinct patterns emerging.
Employment growth in states that have experienced any
increase in jobs during the current recovery has been
slower than in past recoveries. Arizona and Florida are
good examples of this pattern: employment growth in these
states was just over 1% between 2001 and 2003, but
during comparable periods in earlier recoveries, it was two
to four times higher. Elsewhere, in contrast with the 1980s
and 1990s recoveries, there has been a contraction in
employment. Michigan and Ohio fit this pattern: during the
current recovery, employment in these states fell by 1-4%
compared with modest increases in the earlier recoveries.
We have also studied employment growth in the so-called
battleground states of the election, which comprise about
one-third of total non-farm employment. We found that there
is little difference in the employment paths that these and
other states have taken during the current recovery. This
suggests that either compositional shifts in industry employ-
ment – for example, the decline of manufacturing jobs – or
other non-economic factors must explain why the election
was so competitive in these states.
Wages, inequality and poverty
It is more difficult to pin down what has happened to wages
and inequality in the jobless recovery. Some data show
gains in real wages after three years of recovery; others
don’t. Some measures of inequality show modest improve-
ments; others show little change. But as the recovery has
proceeded, wages of workers at the bottom of the distribu-
tion have not improved, at least up to mid-2004. Between
the second quarter of 2003 and the second quarter of
2004, earnings for the bottom 10% of the wage distribution
fell by 1.9%. Over the same 12-month period, earnings for
the bottom 10% of the African-American wage distribution
fell by 3.2%.
Of course, changes in real wages are not the fundamental
problem of the jobless recovery: rather, it is sluggish
employment growth. But what is clear is that the combina-
tion of stagnant employment and sluggish real wage growth
has meant that poverty has risen in this recovery, albeit
modestly. This contrasts with the usual pattern of poverty
falling as GDP grows.
In political discourse, the Bush administration has sought to
treat the rise in poverty as old news, likely to be reversed as
employment rose in late 2004. But several key labour
market statistics that are correlated with poverty show no
improvement at the time of writing. The employment of
Americans who have no more than a high school degree or
who are single parents or African-American have not
improved since the Census Bureau collected the poverty
Disadvantaged groups have had worse employment experiences
relative to other workers than in previous recoveries
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data. Specifically, in the year to September 2004, the
percentage of high school dropouts and African-Americans
in employment remained at 41% and 57%. The equivalent
numbers for single mothers did not improve either.
Explaining the jobless recovery
Is it possible that the jobless recovery is simply a matter of
the NBER incorrectly dating the end of the recession?
While there is a range of uncertainty around the dating of a
recovery, aside from jobs, the current recovery looks
reasonably normal. Profits have risen, GDP has grown and
productivity has increased at the rapid rates of the 1990s.
Industrial production has grown less rapidly than in previous
recoveries but this reflects the continuing shift towards a
service economy. 
Is it possible that the jobless recovery reflects greater rigid-
ity in the US labour market, consistent with the orthodox
explanation of weak employment growth in Europe in the
1990s? Clearly not. Neither the Bush administration nor the
Clinton administration enacted new regulations on
unemployment insurance or welfare benefits that might
affect adversely the level of employment. 
Could the jobless recovery reflect conservative central bank
policy of the type that the European Central Bank adopted
during the 1990s? Again, clearly not. The Federal Reserve
has kept interest rates low during the recovery. As far as we
can tell, Alan Greenspan has not lost his nerve or realistic
view about the US economy.
So how come the great American jobs machine has stalled?
While we cannot claim to have any definitive answer, our
research has uncovered a set of factors that seem to have
had some effect in creating the jobless recovery.
US performance in the 
international economy
The first is the poor performance of the United States in the
international economy. In the current recovery, the trade
deficit has risen to levels that are unprecedented in recent
US experience. Between the fourth quarter of 2001 and the
second quarter of 2004, the ratio of exports minus imports
relative to GDP increased from -4.2% to -5.4%. This is
larger than the normal increase in trade deficits in a recov-
ery, but it is not the largest on record. In the 1980s recov-
ery, the trade deficit rose from -0.5% to -2.4%.
What is unprecedented is the huge drop in foreign direct
investment in the United States as a share of GDP: from
1.6% in 2001 to 0.3% in 2003. In the two previous recov-
eries, foreign direct investment rose as a share of GDP,
presumably directly creating jobs in the United States.
The Bush administration’s Council of Economic Advisors
was recently criticised for downplaying the significance of
jobs being ‘offshored’ in the jobless recovery. But govern-
ment statistics do not provide even crude measures of the
number of jobs being offshored in the service industries. For
example, while Indian exporters report several billion dollars
of exports in computer related and telecoms services and
many major US companies proudly proclaim offshoring of
service sector work as a way to improve profits, government
statistics record less than a billion dollars of service sector
imports declining over time and only a minuscule number of
job losses attributable to offshoring.
The Government Accounting Office recently examined the
quality of official statistics and found them virtually useless
in measuring job losses. We have greater faith in the Indian
statistics and in business announcements that offshoring
has cost the United States a significant number of jobs. 
But simply ascribing some of the jobless growth to interna-
tional factors like trade, foreign direct investment and
offshoring does not give a complete explanation. That the
value of the dollar fell relative to the euro and pound despite
rapid increases in productivity demands some deeper
explanations as to why the United States did not do better
in international markets. 
The impact of health care costs
The second factor behind the jobless recovery is the US
mode of funding medical insurance. Health insurance
spending per employee has risen sharply in the United
States, albeit over a longer period than in the current recov-
ery. It adds a substantial marginal cost to employing
workers, and many firms have sought ways to operate
without committing themselves to permanent workers who
obtain such benefits.
The Kaiser Family Foundation finds that between 2000 and
2003, employment of people with employer-sponsored
health care coverage fell by 2.8%, which is considerably
greater than the overall fall in employment in that period.
This is at least consistent with the notion that some of the
The trade deficit, falling inward investment and offshoring
have all contributed to the jobless recovery
Table 1: The fiscal stimulus as a percentage of
potential GDP was larger in the jobless
recovery than in two preceding recoveries
Recovery Surplus or Deficit (-)
1982 -1.1
1984 -3.6
Change -2.5
1991 -2.4
1993 -2.8
Change -0.4
2001 1.1
2003 -2.8
Change -3.9
Source: Congressional Budget Office. Figures are the standardised budget
surplus or deficit as a share of potential GDP.
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question as to why the fiscal stimulus was taking so long to
create jobs. 
Now that the election is over, we hope that the administra-
tion (and its opponents) will look at the causes of the 
surprising jobless recovery. The United States needs to
recouple employment growth with GDP growth lest the
current jobless recovery gainsays the label of ‘peak 
capitalist economy’ that many bestowed on the country in
the 1990s.  
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stagnant employment growth may be associated with rising
health care costs, and ultimately with the country’s distinct
mode of financing health insurance.
The impact of the fiscal stimulus
The third factor is the nature of the fiscal stimulus, which
gave the vast bulk of the tax cuts to wealthy people whose
propensity to spend quickly is likely to be less than that of
people on middle incomes and below. Table 1 shows that
between 2001 and 2003, the US fiscal deficit rose by 3.9
percentage points relative to potential GDP: from a surplus
of 1.1% to a deficit of 2.8%. This exceeds the increase in
the deficit and the size of stimulus in both the 1980s and
1990s recoveries.
Actual GDP grew by just 8% between 2001 and 2003
despite the huge stimulus. This is a lower growth rate than
in the two previous recoveries when the fiscal stimulus was
weaker. We suspect that the larger stimulus had a smaller
impact on GDP growth because the tax cuts were slanted
to the super-wealthy. 
The impact of structural change
Fourth, continuing structural change, the permanent reloca-
tion of workers from declining industries to growing ones,
has contributed to the jobless recovery. Erica Groshen and
Simon Potter show that the share of total employment in
industries undergoing structural change was 51% during
the mid-1970s and 1980s recoveries and 57% during the
1990s recovery; it is 79% during the current recovery. Their
research suggests that the United States is in the middle of
a period of reaction to the over-expansion of the 1990s,
making structural employment shifts the dominant source of
changes in employment. 
The impact of increased productivity
Finally, we reject the idea that increased productivity
explains the jobless recovery. This is a circular argument.
Increases in productivity due to technological and other
innovations shift out the country’s aggregate supply curve,
which increases the growth of potential GDP and permits
greater growth of employment without inflation than would
otherwise be the case.
The puzzle is why increased productivity coupled with the
fiscal stimulus and low interest rates have not generated
enough GDP growth to crank up the great American jobs
machine as quickly as they did in all previous recoveries.
The surprisingly slow employment recovery raises serious
doubts about the Bush administration’s economic policies
that a few years ago might have looked reasonable in terms
of their likely impact on employment even though they were
distributionally skewed in favour of the wealthy.
Approaching the election, the administration defended its
stimulus package, hoping that eventually employment would
pick up. They based their stance on the modest jobs growth
that began in early 2004 and did not address the key
The fiscal stimulus has been bigger in this recovery than previous
ones but has had a smaller impact on GDP growth
O
ver the past 25 years, UK
economic policy has had
one overarching goal: to
arrest the country’s long-
term decline relative to
other advanced countries and to
establish a premier league economy
that would improve living standards
for all citizens.
At the beginning of the period, the UK
had a highly regulated economy with
large nationalised industries, an
extensive welfare state and
exceptionally obstreperous industrial
relations. By the end of the period,
the UK had one of the least regulated
and least nationalised economies
among advanced countries, with a
welfare system based increasingly on
in-work benefits rather than benefits
to people out of work, and unions
concerned more with the ‘value
added’ they bring to the economy.
Indexes of economic freedom that
measure the market-friendliness of
economic policies and institutions
show that the UK has moved from the
middle of the pack of advanced
countries to a lead position, close to
the United States. Nearly all political
parties and interest groups have come
to accept many of the initially
controversial changes that constituted
the ‘Thatcher revolution’, albeit with
different emphases and concerns over
how best to assure that the reforms
benefited society as a whole. 
Economic policy changes
since 1980
The extent and breadth of the
changes in UK economic policies and
institutions introduced since 1980 are
breathtaking. They include:
n Privatisation of most of the
nationalised industries and of 
many government functions that had
never before been performed by
private groups.
n New in-work benefits and a
reduction in the incentives for 
people to be out of work,
accompanied by other more active
labour market policies.
n Revised labour laws that limited
union powers and increased the
potential for members to affect key
decisions, leading to substantial
changes in union attitudes and
policies and the introduction of new
modes for union recognition.
n Changes in the structure and
financing of the educational system,
covering students from the age 
of four through to university, with 
the development of a national
curriculum and a more centralised
education system.
n New modes of financing 
pensions that shifted the burden of
funding from the state to individuals
through company pension plans or
private plans.
n Tax laws that encouraged employee
share ownership.
n Increased housing ownership by
the sale of council flats to residents.
n Elimination of restrictions on 
capital flows.
n Restructuring of the National 
Health Insurance medical system.
n Elimination of wage councils’
modes of setting minimum wages and
eventual introduction of a national
minimum wage.
CentrePiece Autumn 200428
Seeking a 
premier 
economy
In the 1980s and 1990s, successive UK
governments enacted a series of economic
reforms to establish a more market-oriented
economy. A major new book assesses the
impact on productivity, employment and
income inequality.
n Regular publication of league tables
in the public sector to measure the
effectiveness of individual hospitals
and schools.
Did the reforms improve 
economic performance
and/or increase inequality?
During this period of reform, the
secular decline of UK productivity and
GDP per capita relative to other
advanced countries came to an end.
By the 1990s, the country was
outperforming most other advanced
economies in both the level of
unemployment and the proportion of
the population in employment.
At the same time, there was a large
rise in income inequality, which was
the result of rapidly growing incomes
for people at the top of the income
distribution rather than of falling
incomes for people at the bottom of
the distribution. This meant that the
UK avoided the US problem of falling
real earnings for lower paid workers.
The rough concordance of economic
changes with reforms provides weak
or circumstantial evidence that the
reforms succeeded in altering the UK
economy. The macroeconomic
evidence is circumstantial because at
the level of an entire economy, it is
difficult to determine what is the
appropriate counterfactual. Perhaps
the UK’s relative economic
performance would have improved
even without market-friendly changes
in policies. New Zealand introduced
diverse market reforms much like
those in the UK but its economic
performance worsened relative to
other countries. Some smaller
European countries like Ireland and
the Netherlands performed well
without undertaking massive pro-
market reforms.
To determine whether reforms did in
fact contribute to the UK’s improved
economic performance, to the UK’s
rise in inequality or to both, we need
to examine the microeconomics of
particular reforms and their impact on
intended and unintended economic
outcomes. A new book presents a set
of studies assessing many of the
economic reforms adopted during the
1980s and 1990s, focusing
particularly on the reforms of labour
and product markets that are likely to
have had an impact on productivity,
employment and income inequality.
The work is almost entirely
microeconomic, focusing on the
effects of particular reforms on closely
associated outcomes rather than on
the macroeconomy. This approach
offers more readily determinable
counterfactuals than analyses of
aggregate outcomes. It allows
researchers to compare specific
outcomes before and after reforms
and to compare the outcomes for
people, firms or sectors more or less
affected by the reforms.
Given the measurement error of GDP,
any particular reform is likely to have
effects on GDP that are hard to
discern. Hence the microeconomic
approach provides the only reliable
way to assess the benefits and costs
of particular changes. At the same
time, the approach misses the
possibility that reforms cumulate to
something greater than their linear
sum, perhaps producing non-linear
synergies for the aggregate economy.
The principal finding of the book is
that the bulk of the UK’s economic
reforms contributed positively to
economic performance but with some
cost in rising inequality. (But since the
real wage rose, policy did not create
poverty, although possibly some other
set of policy changes might have
reduced – or raised – poverty.)
Underlying this broad theme is a set
of specific findings summarised in
what follows.
Making the economy more
market-friendly
The reforms accomplished their main
policy goal of making the economy –
and, in particular, the labour market –
more market-friendly. Diverse
measures of the degree to which
market forces rather than
administrative rulings determine
economic outcomes show that the UK
became one of the most market-
friendly economies in the advanced
world. These measures range from
the broad aggregate indexes of
economic freedom developed by
conservative think tanks to more
specific indexes of labour market and
product market regulations developed
by the OECD and various
independent scholars.
The UK deregulated product markets
and privatised nationalised industries
earlier and/or to a greater extent than
its main European partners. In the
labour market, the absence of
employment protection and other
regulations meant that the UK was
more market-dependent than other
European countries even while they
reduced regulations and the UK 
did not do so.
Privatisation
Privatisation of traditionally
nationalised industries was a major
part of the UK reforms and reduced
the publicly owned proportion of 
GDP from 12% in 1979 to 2% two
decades later. Much of the
privatisation effort was undertaken 
so that the private sector would make
the massive investments needed in
the relevant sectors, rather than
having the public sector make the
investments, which would be counted
as part of public spending. In most
cases, however, because of the
nature of the businesses, privatisation
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The overall ambition of UK
economic policy since 1980
has been to arrest long-term
relative decline
Market-oriented reforms 
have accomplished the broad
goal of improving relative
economic performance
was accompanied by increased
regulatory activity.
Privatisation was associated with
improved productivity but the
improvement occurred largely before
the actual act of privatisation as public
sector managers restructured existing
plants in order to bring the public firm
to market. Whether the firms could
have undertaken similar changes
while remaining public is uncertain.
Foreign-owned firms
With its freedom to move capital and
its extensive stock market, the UK has
a particularly open capital market,
which makes it easy for foreign firms
to enter. Establishments that are
foreign-owned tend to have higher and
more rapidly increasing labour
productivity than domestic firms. This
is due primarily to higher levels of
investment and a larger proportion of
skilled and higher paid workers.
But establishments that change
ownership nationality do not experience
large changes in productivity. Thus, it
appears that it is largely through greater
investment in human and physical
capital that foreign-owned firms make a
special contribution to the UK economy.
Employee share ownership
The UK sought to increase share
ownership by workers in their own
firms in the hope of improving their
commitment and raising productivity.
The specific policies to encourage
employee ownership and involvement
varied modestly over time, but the
basic idea in all cases was to give tax
breaks to firms that provided profit-
sharing, share options or share
ownership to workers. Unlike in 
the United States, where employee
share ownership plans encourage
collective ownership in retirement
plans, the UK schemes encourage
individual ownership.
The results of the policy appear to be
positive. Firms that reward workers in
part on the basis of company
performance have a higher incidence
of information sharing and
consultation with workers than other
firms. And while the productivity
effects of programmes vary with the
particulars, firms that have profit-
sharing and employee share
ownership tend to outperform other
firms in productivity and financial
performance.
Social policy reform
In the area of social policy reform, 
the UK sought to improve the
incentive for working in its social
welfare system, with some modest
success. Some heralded reforms in
social programmes, such as changes
in benefit schedules, had more
modest positive effects on economic
performance than proponents
anticipated and correspondingly less
adverse effects on income distribution
than opponents feared.
The reason for this is that the UK’s
income-linked benefit system is highly
interrelated so that declines in the
amount received or the eligibility to
participate in one benefit programme
are often partially offset by increased
participation in other benefit
programmes. This makes both the
incentive and income distribution
effects of reforms much less 
than might appear from analysis of a
single programme.
Tax credits
The main thrust of UK reforms of
welfare programmes has been to
increase the benefits accruing to
those in work relative to those not in
work. In 1988, the relevant legislation
was the Family Tax Credit of 1988; 
in 1999, this was replaced by the
Working Families Tax Credit.
The UK reforms had a much more
modest effect on labour supply than
comparable reforms in the United
States, where the Earned Income Tax
Credit and the Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families welfare policy
produced a sizeable drop in the
number of people on welfare and
increased employment among the
affected families. The prime reason 
for this is that in the UK income from
in-work benefits counts as income in
the computation of housing and other
benefits, so  that policy reforms have
a much dampened impact on the
incentive to work. In addition, the UK
increased out-of-work benefits while
the United States reduced those
benefits, providing less incentive to
increase labour supply.
The New Deal
UK policies towards unemployed
young people were also designed to
move people from dependence on
the state to work. The New Deal for
young people introduced in 1998 
had both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ elements to
get young unemployed people into
work. Some of the push involved
toughening the work search criterion
along lines originally developed in the
mid-1980s. The pull involved a job
subsidy for employers as well as
government or volunteer work 
for young people unable to find
regular jobs.
Despite publicity that implied that the
programme involved massive
increases in spending and huge
numbers of young people, the
programme had a marginally positive
impact in raising youth employment at
a modest additional cost. The net
social benefits of the additional
employment appear to have
outweighed the costs.
Pensions
The basic design of UK pension
reforms was to encourage workers
and firms to contract out part of
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The UK has avoided 
the US problem of falling 
real earnings for lower 
paid workers
Income inequality in 
the UK has become
increasingly similar to 
that in the United States
pensions through fully-funded
occupational schemes, which would
reduce the ‘pay-as-you-go’ costs of
publicly provided pensions. The law
required individuals to belong to some
pension plan: an employers’ scheme,
a state-funded scheme or an
individually purchased scheme.
Favourable tax advantages induced a
large proportion of the population to
purchase personal pensions in the
1980s and 1990s.
At the end of the 1990s, the
government introduced further
reforms with its stakeholder pensions
for low wage workers. The shift to
greater reliance on private pension
provision allowed the UK to have the
lowest rate of future state spending
on pensions among advanced
countries. The development of private
pensions appears to have improved
job mobility, with workers who chose
private pensions evincing more
mobility than those with company
pension plans.
Trade unions
In the area of the labour market and
income distribution, the UK moved
from reliance on collective bargaining
in the determination of wages and
working conditions to reliance on the
competitive market. The decline 
was due in part to reforms of 
labour law designed to curb 
union power but also to greater
competition in the product market,
which required firms to reform their
industrial relations practices.
Prior to reforms, the UK’s unionised
sector was marked by lower
productivity and considerable strike
activity. Faced with a tight
macroeconomic environment, greater
competition from non-union firms and
loss of government statutory and 
non-statutory support, unionised
establishments adopted new work
practices that brought labour
productivity up to non-union levels.
Since UK employers do not have the
same anti-union animus of US 
firms, the government’s industrial
relations reforms that make it easier
for unions to gain recognition from
firms are likely to have only small
consequences for the coverage of
collective bargaining.
Inequality and the 
minimum wage
Institutional changes in the labour
market – such as the decline of
unionisation and the introduction of
the national minimum wage in 1999 –
had substantial effects on the level of
income inequality. The more rapid
decline of unionisation than in the
United States was a major factor in
the more rapid increase in inequality
in the UK.
In contrast, the introduction of the
national minimum wage contributed to
the convergence in the pattern of
inequality among women. Inequality
among women was higher than in the
United States before the UK enacted
its minimum wage and remained
higher afterwards. But the minimum
wage reduced UK inequality towards
the US level in 1999. Overall, the
extent and pattern of wage inequality
in the UK became increasingly similar
to that in the United States as a more
market-driven economy was adopted.
Mobility and joblessness
The UK subsidises council housing to
tenants and sells the housing to
tenants at attractive rates. Although
home ownership can be viewed as a
positive good in itself, it has been
criticised as potentially immobilising
tenants and thus producing pockets
of poverty and unemployment. But the
implicit rent subsidy in council housing
appears to be less important in
reducing mobility than the lack of
skills among tenants: UK residential
mobility is in the middle of rates in
Europe; and the sale of council
housing in the 1990s did not produce
ghettoised neighbourhoods.
In contrast to the localised job market
for non-graduate workers, the UK
developed an integrated market for
graduate workers. A principal reason
for the difference is that unemployed
less educated workers rarely move to
different regions without having first
found a job while university graduates
are highly mobile after graduation.
Poverty
In sharp contrast to the convergence
of inequality between the UK and the
United States, the rates of poverty
measured in absolute terms diverged
between the two countries. In the UK,
expanding government benefits
reduced poverty considerably, whereas
in the United States the impact of
benefits was almost negligible. The
greatest divergence in benefits is for
workless households, whose
proportion has grown sharply in the UK
while falling in the United States.
Over the same period, relative
poverty, which depends critically on
the distribution of wages, rose more
sharply in the UK than in the United
States, bringing the overall income
distribution of the two countries 
closer together.
This article summarises Seeking a Premier
Economy: The Economic Effects of British
Economic Reforms 1980-2000 edited by
David Card, Richard Blundell and Richard
B Freeman (The University of Chicago
Press). The book comprises studies
undertaken by a team of leading British and
North American economists under the
auspices of CEP, the Institute for Fiscal
Studies and the National Bureau of
Economic Research.
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Privatisation has been
associated with improved
productivity
Unionised firms have 
adopted new work practices
bringing productivity up to
non-union levels
Answers to this question are given in Table 1. They show
that a 10% reduction in average journey times throughout
Britain would raise productivity by 1.12% and by nearly
twice as much for places where access to cities is
increased the most.
It should be noted that these numbers represent the
‘induced’ productivity gain and are additional to any effects
that would be included in a standard cost-benefit analysis of
a transport improvement, such as direct cost and time
savings. We have not experimented with reducing travel
time on particular routes or in particular regions, but the
results of the nationwide experiment are generated for each
NUTS3 sub-region.
The table reports the average results for each NUTS1
region and the minimum and maximum values in each of
these areas. In very low-density areas, speeding up trans-
port has essentially no induced productivity effect, hence
the low minimum values for Scotland and the South West.
The highest value is for Peterborough, which would enjoy a
2.22% productivity increase, gaining from improved access
to both the London area and the Midlands. 
This article summarises ‘Spatial Determinants of Productivity: 
Analysis for the Regions of Great Britain’ by Patricia Rice and
Anthony J Venables, CEP Discussion Paper No. 642
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0642.pdf). The paper was
written as part of the Evidence Based Policy Fund project
‘Regional Inequalities in the UK: Productivity, Earnings and Skills’.
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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR).
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Table 1: Percentage productivity gain from a 
10% reduction in all driving times
Average Minimum Maximum
GB average 1.12 
North East 0.81 0.53 1.04 
North West 1.10 0.88 1.44 
Yorks-Humberside 1.25 1.07 1.45 
East Midlands 1.33 0.69 1.66 
West Midlands 1.30 0.88 1.73 
East 1.35 0.32 2.22 
London 0.90 0.73 1.08 
South East 1.31 0.99 1.66 
South West 1.08 0.31 1.62 
Wales 1.09 0.48 1.57 
Scotland 0.80 0.00 1.55 
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